【题目】 A Deduction Mechanism for Public Goods Provision: Theory and Experiment

【主讲人】香港岭南大学洪福海副教授

【主持人】国色天香1区二区三区四区连洪泉副教授

【时间】 12月28日（周四）16:30

【地点】经济与管理学院文2栋301会议室

【摘要】

We propose a simple commitment mechanism prior to a public goods contribution game. Each player simultaneously and independently proposes a deduction rate, which serves as a proposal for the rate by which the return on private investment accounts will be reduced. The group deduction rate is determined by the minimum level of the individually proposed rates. In the two-stage game with linear payoffs, the first-best outcome is achieved in the refined equilibrium, with a sufficiently high group deduction rate being chosen. The mechanism also improves efficiency for non-linear games. We conduct a laboratory experiment to empirically investigate whether and how our counter-intuitive mechanism works. The experimental findings highlight the importance of learning opportunities via examples. Even with repeated play, many subjects persist in choosing low deduction rates and therefore, welfare remains low. However, with exogenously given examples of group deduction rates, subjects learn quickly and achieve efficient outcomes when they later determine the deduction rates endogenously. 

[主讲人简介]

洪福海，香港科技大学经济学博士，现为香港岭南大学经济系副教授，曾任教于上海财经大学和新加坡南洋理工大学。主要研究方向为行为与实验经济学、应用微观经济理论。论文发表在Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Public Economics, Management Science等国际著名期刊。